Why reasons and reasoning don't come apart

Article Philosophy

Action and Rationalization

Samuel Asarnow

Summary: According to the 'standard story' in the philosophy of action, actions are movements of a creature's body caused and rationalized by the creature's mental states. This paper presents a new argument for including the rationalization condition in the causal theory of action, and outlines a broadly Davidsonian theory of rationalization.

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY (2022)

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Article Philosophy

Inference Is Not a Process

Christian Kietzmann

Summary: Inference, as a form of conscious and active belief-revision, has been of interest to philosophers of mind. While many writings depict inference as a process, the assumption that inference takes time is conceptually flawed. Inferences do not require time to occur.

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY (2022)

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Article Philosophy

Can realists reason with reasons?

Christian Kietzmann

Summary: The argument posits that realism about reasons is incompatible with the possibility of reasoning with reasons. The reason is that realists believe that we are aware of reasons through ordinary beliefs, but a proper understanding of reasoning excludes our awareness of reasons consisting in beliefs. The author presents five claims made by realists, explains certain assumptions about reasoning, and shows why this understanding of realism cannot accommodate the fact that we reason with reasons. Two proposals for solving this problem are then considered.

PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS (2022)

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Article Philosophy

Where reasons and reasoning come apart

Eva Schmidt

Summary: Proponents of the reasoning view believe normative reasons are premises of good reasoning, but this paper aims to challenge this view by providing counterexamples.

NOUS (2021)

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Article Philosophy