Anti-natalism is incompatible with Theory X

The anti-natalist philosopher David Benatar defends a position asserting that all life is harmful, and that it is, therefore, wrong to have children. In this paper, I critique Benatar's less-discussed claim that his anti-natalism provides solutions to population ethics problems, such as the Non-Identity Problem, the Repugnant Conclusion, and the Mere Addition Problem, all of which are presented in Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons. Since the publication of his Better Never to Have Been, Benatar has continued to claim that its provision of such solutions strengthens his defense of anti-natalism. Although Benatar's view has received much criticism, this argument has not been discussed at length. I undertake a thorough examination of the argument and identify reasons to reject it. The central point of my critique is that the implications of Benatar's views in determining ranges of wrong and not-wrong cases of procreation are extensionally inadequate when applied to the problems of population ethics.

Automated summary

This paper critiques David Benatar's claim that his anti-natalism provides solutions to population ethics problems and argues that its application in population ethics is insufficient.