The Matter of Coincidence

The phasalist solution to the puzzle of the statue and the piece of clay claims that being a statue is a phase sortal property of the piece of clay, just like being a child is a phase sortal property of a human being. Some philosophers reject this solution because it cannot account for cases where the statue seems to gain and lose parts that the piece of clay does not. I rebut this objection by arguing, contrary to the prevailing view, that the piece of clay is not mereologically constant and might even be highly mereologically flexible.

Automated summary

The phasalist solution suggests that being a statue is a phase property of the piece of clay, similar to being a child as a phase property of a human being. However, some philosophers doubt this explanation as it fails to account for cases where the statue appears to have parts that the clay does not. The author argues against this objection by discussing the properties of the clay, suggesting that it is not necessarily constant and can be flexible in terms of its parts.