Organizational Top Dog (vs. Underdog) Narratives Increase the Punishment of Corporate Moral Transgressions: When Dominance is a Liability and Prestige is an Asset

Although company narratives frequently emphasize impressive sales numbers and market leadership, such an organizational top dog narrative can backfire when companies are accused of engaging in unethical conduct. This research demonstrates, through a series of nine (N = 3872) experimental studies, that an organizational top dog (vs. underdog) narrative increases the intended punishment of company moral transgressions but not non-moral transgressions. Such differences in intended punishment emerge because observers infer that organizations with a top dog narrative use predominantly dominance-based strategies to achieve their status, whereas companies with an underdog narrative are less likely perceived as employing such strategies. We provide preliminary evidence that a debiasing intervention decreases the harsher punishment of organizations with a top dog narrative but does not affect the punishment of organizations with an underdog narrative.

Automated summary

This research demonstrates that an organizational top dog narrative increases the intended punishment of company moral transgressions. Observers infer that organizations with a top dog narrative use dominance-based strategies to achieve their status, while companies with an underdog narrative are perceived as less likely to employ such strategies. A debiasing intervention can lessen the punishment of organizations with a top dog narrative.