Transparency's impact on the professionalization of government

Freedom of information (FOI) laws are known to expose governmental weaknesses, but do they improve the structural workings of public administration, professionalizing governance? This study examines FOI's effect on a cornerstone of effective governance-bureaucratic hiring. Using coarsened matching methods to compare over 5400 municipalities in Brazil-approximately half possessing FOI regulations and half without-we identify significant reductions in discretionary patronage-based appointments. Municipalities with FOI regulations reduce both higher level political control and lower-level electoral rewards hires. Our explanation, tentatively supported by a comparison of early versus late FOI adopters, centers on sequencing: in the short term, leaders view FOI as a supplement to administrative control and thus reduce higher-level hires. As FOI becomes more institutionalized and exposures more probable, leaders reduce lower-level hires. Contributing to scholarship on transparency and bureaucracies, our results enjoin policymakers to double-down on commitments to FOI policies.

Automated summary

This study examines the impact of Freedom of Information (FOI) laws on bureaucratic hiring in Brazil. Findings show that municipalities with FOI regulations have significant reductions in discretionary patronage-based appointments, reducing both political control and electoral rewards hires. The study suggests that the effects are influenced by the sequencing of FOI adoption, with leaders initially viewing FOI as a supplement to administrative control and later reducing lower-level hires as FOI becomes more institutionalized.