The coalitional politics of the European Union Regulation on deforestation-free products

This paper analyses the belief-and interest-driven coalitional politics of the new European Union Regulation on deforestation-free products (EUDR) by applying the Advocacy Coalition Framework and Baptist & Bootlegger Theory. Our results first show how two PRO-Regulation Coalitions advocated for new European Union (EU) trade rules: key members of a Sustainable Development Coalition and an Environmental Coalition include key sus- tainability-and environmentally-oriented EU institutions, import-dependent EU Member States, non-governmental organisations, civil society groups, and some food and forest certifiers. Second, a PRO-EUDR Business Coalition - mainly composed of multinational business actors such as consumer goods companies and retailers, import-dependent European companies, some EU domestic producers from the agricultural sector, and their respective associations - joined the PRO-Coalitions in a strategic cross-coalitional PRO-Regulation Alliance to pursue business-oriented pro-regulatory interests. Third, the building of this Alliance facilitated political momentum for the EUDR's agenda-setting, drafting and adoption despite opposition from a weaker CONTRA-Regulation Coalition of status-quo-oriented policy advocates among some EU institutions, forest-rich EU Member States, agricultural certifiers, tropical producer country governmental authorities, as well as Euro-pean and non-EU companies and their associations from the forest, agricultural and food sectors. Fourth, the EUDR's final legislative text is a compromise solution, institutionalising different core beliefs and interests of pro -and contra-regulatory state and non-state actors. Pro-change actors were more powerful in institutionalising their beliefs and interests.

Automated summary

This paper analyzes the coalition politics driven by beliefs and interests in the new European Union Regulation on deforestation-free products (EUDR). The study identifies pro-regulation and contra-regulation coalitions and highlights the strategic alliance formed between pro-EUDR business actors and other pro-coalitions. Despite opposition from a weaker contra-regulation coalition, the EUDR was ultimately institutionalized as a compromise solution accommodating different beliefs and interests of state and non-state actors.