ACTS OF THOUGHT AND RE-ENACTMENT IN COLLINGWOOD'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

This article explores one of Collingwood's most puzzling claims-that, in re-enacting a past act of thought, I can revive not just the propositional content of that act but also the very act of thought itself. This aspect of Collingwood's ideas has been largely ignored, and, when not ignored, it has been almost universally rejected. After all, we might ask, how can it be that two acts of thought-one, say, had by Carol in the library on Wednesday and another act of thought had by Harold in his study on Thursday-are literally identical? I explore this baffling claim and, in particular, Collingwood's argument that acts of thought can have the identity of a continuant. I try to show how the idea of the identity of the continuant might be used to remove some of the puzzlement in Collingwood's claim about literal identity between acts of thought; I thus show how Harold, on Thursday, might be able to experience the exact same act of thought that Carol had on Wednesday.

Automated summary

This article explores one of Collingwood's most puzzling claims about thought acts - the ability to revive both the propositional content and the act of thought itself when re-enacting a past thought act. The article examines Collingwood's argument that thought acts can have the identity of a continuant, aiming to clarify the puzzling claim and demonstrate how it is possible for two different individuals to experience the exact same thought act.