Investor-Paid Rating Agency, Information Disclosure, and Stock Price Crash Risk

This paper examines the impact of investor-paid rating agency on stock price crash risk. The findings reveal a substantial 127.6% reduction in the stock price crash risk for stocks tracked by investor-paid rating agency compared to those without such tracking. As for the mechanism, the following of investor-paid rating agency reduces earnings management, induces more negative information disclosure, and improves information disclosure quality. The impact of investor-paid rating agency is more pronounced in firms with poorer corporate governance. Further analysis indicates that the impact of investor-paid rating agency increases with the frequency of rating tracking and the rating difference between issuer-paid rating agency and investor-paid rating agency, while stock market reaction induced by investor-paid rating agency has little effect on the baseline result. Moreover, the tracking of investor-paid rating agency facilitates the information flow between the bond market and stock market, and improves analyst forecast performance. In summary, we suggest that investor-paid rating agency tracking acts as a valid passive monitoring mechanism to alleviate principal-agent problems and provide information on firms' downside risk.

Automated summary

This paper examines the impact of investor-paid rating agency on stock price crash risk. The findings reveal that stocks tracked by investor-paid rating agencies have a significant reduction in stock price crash risk compared to those without such tracking. The mechanism behind this is that investor-paid rating agencies reduce earnings management, induce more negative information disclosure, and improve information disclosure quality. The impact of investor-paid rating agency is more pronounced in firms with poorer corporate governance.