A Higher-Order Account of the Phenomenology of Particularity

Many theorists maintain that perceptual experience exhibits the what is often called the phenomenology of particularity: that in perceptual experience it phenomenally seems that there are particular things. Some urge that this phenomenology demands special accounts of perception on which particulars somehow constitute perceptual experience, including versions of relationalism, on which perception is a relation between perceivers and particular perceived objects, or complex forms of representationalism, on which perception exhibits demonstrative or special particular-involving types of content. I argue here that no such account required. I develop and defend a novel account of such phenomenology, grounded in the higher-order theory of consciousness. In short, this view holds that the phenomenology of particularity arises because suitable higher-order states make it appear to one that one is in perceptual relations to particulars, even if perception is not in any way constituted by particulars. I argue that this account has many advantages and avoids problems that other theories of such phenomenology face.

Automated summary

This article discusses the phenomenology of particularity in perceptual experience. While some theorists argue that this phenomenology demands special accounts of perception, the author presents a novel view grounded in the higher-order theory of consciousness, suggesting that the appearance of particularity arises from suitable higher-order states rather than any constitutive relationship between perception and particulars.