Is disgust (in)compatible with the political project of a liberal society? The problem of disgust in Martha Nussbaum's theory of emotions

This research deals with the political use of emotions in public discourse. In particular, it analyzes the problematic role that disgust plays in Martha Nussbaum's theory of emotions and its (in)compatibility with the political project of an aspirational liberal society. Nussbaum recognizes that disgust is an emotion inherent to the human condition -as a pre-social tendency rooted in our animal heritage- but asserts that its social effects are always negative. According to the author, disgust is an emotion that serves the preservation of social hierarchies and therefore has no place in fair liberal societies. Are the liberal values of equality, liberty, and justice incompatible with the emotion of disgust? In this paper, we argue that the exclusion of disgust from the political sphere is insufficient to avoid its negative effects and is incompatible with the project of a liberal society. On the contrary, properly used disgust can be beneficial for the defense of the values of equality, freedom, and justice.

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This research examines the political role of emotions in public discourse, focusing on the problematic nature of disgust in Martha Nussbaum's theory of emotions and its compatibility with the goal of a liberal society. Nussbaum acknowledges the inherent nature of disgust as a pre-social emotion rooted in our animal heritage, but argues that its social effects are always negative. The author discusses whether the liberal values of equality, liberty, and justice can coexist with the emotion of disgust and argues that excluding disgust from the political sphere is insufficient and incompatible with the project of a liberal society. Instead, properly utilized disgust can actually help defend the values of equality, freedom, and justice.