Hinge commitments as arational beliefs

Hinge epistemology is a family of views that offers a novel approach to avoiding skeptical conclusions about the possibility of a posteriori justification of our empirical beliefs. They claim that at the basis of our empirical beliefs lie certain commitments whose rational status is not determined by our evidence. These are called hinge commitments. Prominent hinge epistemologists have claimed that hinge commitments are either rational or arational but yet not beliefs. I argue that such views are subject to decisive objections. I then offer what I consider to be the best version of hinge epistemology. On this view, hinge commitments are best understood as arational beliefs that contingently inform our worldview. I call this view the Arational Beliefs View.

Automated summary

Hinge epistemology offers a new approach to avoid skeptical conclusions about a posteriori justification of our empirical beliefs. It argues that our empirical beliefs are based on certain commitments that are not determined by evidence alone. These commitments, known as hinge commitments, are considered either rational or arational but not beliefs by prominent hinge epistemologists. However, I propose that these views are subject to objections and instead offer the Arational Beliefs View, which considers hinge commitments as contingent and informing our worldview as arational beliefs.