The impact of labor subsidy, taxation and corruption on individual behavior

In this study, the effects of labor subsidy, taxation, and corruption mechanism on individual behavior are examined within the context of the public goods game. A specific focus is placed on the investigation of how individuals can obtain labor subsidies through the implementation of reward and punishment strategies based on taxation. The findings reveal that a moderate labor subsidy value fosters stable alliances between cooperators and executors, effectively excluding defectors, and this system remains robust under high tax levels. Additionally, it is noted that only the incentive provided by the reward mechanism can facilitate the invasion of defectors. Intuitively, the presence of a corruption mechanism exerts minimal influence on the average level of individual behavior when executors receive increased labor subsidies.

Automated summary

This study investigates the impact of labor subsidy, taxation, and corruption mechanism on individual behavior in the public goods game. The focus is on how individuals can obtain labor subsidies through reward and punishment strategies based on taxation. The results show that a moderate labor subsidy promotes stable alliances between cooperators and executors, effectively excluding defectors, even under high tax levels. It is also found that only rewards can incentivize defectors. Interestingly, the corruption mechanism has minimal influence on individual behavior when executors receive increased labor subsidies.