Counterfactual and seeing-to-it responsibilities in strategic games

The article studies two forms of responsibility in the setting of strategic games with imperfect information. They are referred to as seeing-to-it responsibility and counterfactual responsibility. It shows that counterfactual responsibility is definable through seeing-to-it, but not the other way around. The article also proposes a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes the interplay between the seeing-to-it modality and the individual ex ante knowledge modality. & COPY; 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Automated summary

The article examines two types of responsibility, seeing-to-it responsibility and counterfactual responsibility, in strategic games with imperfect information. It demonstrates that counterfactual responsibility can be defined through seeing-to-it responsibility, but not the other way around. Additionally, the article presents a comprehensive and sound bimodal logical system that captures the interaction between the seeing-to-it modality and the individual ex ante knowledge modality.