How to promote the Chinese Certified Emission Reduction scheme in the carbon market? A study based on tripartite evolutionary game model

The Chinese Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) scheme is of great significance for China to achieve its dual carbon targets. However, limited effort has been made to explore the CCER scheme due to poor data availability and the short implementation time. Therefore, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, carbon emission control enterprise, and renewable energy enterprise, to analyze the evolutionary stability of each subject's strategy choice. The results indicate that: (1) Strict regulation of the government could promote carbon emission control enterprise to actively purchase CCER quotas, and motivate renewable energy enterprise to declare CCER projects. (2) When the corresponding condition is met, the system could reach the ideal evolutionary steady state of (1,1,1), and keep a stable operational status for the CCER scheme market. (3) The condition of the CCER price below the carbon price, appropriate penalties for noncompliance of carbon emissions, the dynamic balance between carbon offset rate and project declaration cost, and proper subsidies for CCER project declaration, all could promote the development of CCER projects in the carbon market. This study could enrich the knowledge hierarchy of CCER and provide important decision references for developing the CCER scheme in the carbon market.

Automated summary

The Chinese Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) scheme is of great significance for China to achieve its dual carbon targets. A tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the evolutionary stability of each subject's strategy choice. The results show that strict government regulation, proper pricing, penalties, and subsidies can promote the development of CCER projects in the carbon market.