Journal
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW
Volume 95, Issue -, Pages 1-18Publisher
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2016.08.005
Keywords
Disaster relief; Humanitarian logistics; Financial funds; Supply chains; Competition for funds; Materiel convergence; NGOs; Optimization; Generalized Nash Equilibrium; Variational inequalities
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Funding
- John F. Smith Memorial Fund at the University of Massachusetts Amherst
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We develop a Generalized Nash Equilibrium network model for post-disaster humanitarian relief by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs derive utility from providing relief supplies to victims of the disaster at demand points in a supply chain context while competing with each other for financial funds provided by donations. The shared constraints consist of lower and upper bounds for demand for relief items at the demand points to reduce materiel convergence or congestion. This game theory problem is reformulated as an optimization problem and numerical examples and a theoretical case study on Hurricane Katrina given. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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