Mechanisms that govern how the Price of Anarchy varies with travel demand

Selfish routing, represented by the User-Equilibrium (UE) model, is known to be inefficient when compared to the System Optimum (SO) model. However, there is currently little understanding of how the magnitude of this inefficiency, which can be measured by the Price of Anarchy (PoA), varies across different structures of demand and supply. Such understanding would be useful for both transport policy and network design, as it could help to identify circumstances in which policy interventions that are designed to induce more efficient use of a traffic network, are worth their costs of implementation. This paper identifies four mechanisms that govern how the PoA varies with travel demand in traffic networks with separable and strictly increasing cost functions. For each OD movement, these are expansions and contractions in the sets of routes that are of minimum cost under UE and minimum marginal total cost under SO. The effects of these mechanisms on the PoA are established via a combination of theoretical proofs and conjectures supported by numerical evidence. In addition, for the special case of traffic networks with BPR-like cost functions having common power, it is proven that there is a systematic relationship between link flows under UE and SO, and hence between the levels of demand at which expansions and contractions occur. For this case, numerical evidence also suggests that the PoA has power law decay for large demand. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.