Journal
SENSORS
Volume 16, Issue 7, Pages -Publisher
MDPI
DOI: 10.3390/s16071138
Keywords
mobile opportunistic crowdsensing; incentive mechanism; data query; two-person cooperative game; optimal stopping theory
Funding
- China Postdoctoral Science Foundation [2015M580051]
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [61370192, 61432015, 61428203, 61572347]
- U.S. National Science Foundation [CNS-1319915, CNS-1343355]
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In this paper, we propose effective data collection schemes that stimulate cooperation between selfish users in mobile opportunistic crowdsensing. A query issuer generates a query and requests replies within a given delay budget. When a data provider receives the query for the first time from an intermediate user, the former replies to it and authorizes the latter as the owner of the reply. Different data providers can reply to the same query. When a user that owns a reply meets the query issuer that generates the query, it requests the query issuer to pay credits. The query issuer pays credits and provides feedback to the data provider, which gives the reply. When a user that carries a feedback meets the data provider, the data provider pays credits to the user in order to adjust its claimed expertise. Queries, replies and feedbacks can be traded between mobile users. We propose an effective mechanism to define rewards for queries, replies and feedbacks. We formulate the bargain process as a two-person cooperative game, whose solution is found by using the Nash theorem. To improve the credit circulation, we design an online auction process, in which the wealthy user can buy replies and feedbacks from the starving one using credits. We have carried out extensive simulations based on real-world traces to evaluate the proposed schemes.
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