Heuristics Can Produce Surprisingly Rational Probability Estimates: Comment on Costello and Watts (2014)

Costello and Watts (2014) present a model assuming that people's knowledge of probabilities adheres to probability theory, but that their probability judgments are perturbed by a random noise in the retrieval from memory. Predictions for the relationships between probability judgments for constituent events and their disjunctions and conjunctions, as well as for sums of such judgments were derived from probability theory. Costello and Watts (2014) report behavioral data showing that subjective probability judgments accord with these predictions. Based on the finding that subjective probability judgments follow probability theory, Costello and Watts (2014) conclude that the results imply that people's probability judgments embody the rules of probability theory and thereby refute theories of heuristic processing. Here, we demonstrate the invalidity of this conclusion by showing that all of the tested predictions follow straightforwardly from an account assuming heuristic probability integration (Nilsson, Winman, Juslin, & Hansson, 2009). We end with a discussion of a number of previous findings that harmonize very poorly with the predictions by the model suggested by Costello and Watts (2014).