Journal
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS
Volume 44, Issue 1, Pages 54-58Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2015.11.008
Keywords
Supremum-norm cost games; Core stability; Cooperative cost games; Allocation rule
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Funding
- Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion [MTM2011-23205, MTM2014-54199-P]
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This paper presents a new class of cooperative cost games, supremum-norm cost games, which emerges as a natural extension of k-norm games introduced by Meca and Sosic (2014) and can be seen as a generalization of the airport games introduced by Littlechild and Owen (1973). We show that it is reasonable to expect formation of the grand coalition in such setting, and describe allocations that lead to stability of the grand coalition and reduce the individual cost of each agent. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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