The dark side of investor interactive platforms: Evidence from corporate investment efficiency

This research investigates the impact of investor interactive platforms (IIPs), a novel firm-investor communication channel in China, on corporate investment efficiency. While IIPs are designed to bridge the informational asymmetry between firms and investors through online question-andanswer interaction, we observe that IIPs unintendedly reduce investment efficiency, reflected in over- and under-investment. We further employ multiple fixed effects and difference-indifferences analyses to strengthen the causality of our results. Cross-sectionally, the documented effect is more pronounced for firms with weak monitoring intensity and high financing constraints. Overall, our findings unveil the dark side of IIPs, whereby managers may exploit them for information manipulation, thereby exacerbating moral hazard and adverse selection, which ultimately undermine investment efficiency.

Automated summary

This research examines the impact of investor interactive platforms (IIPs) on corporate investment efficiency in China. Despite their intention to bridge information asymmetry between firms and investors through online question-and-answer interaction, IIPs unexpectedly reduce investment efficiency, leading to over- and under-investment. The study employs various empirical analyses to establish the causal relationship, finding that this effect is more pronounced for firms with weak monitoring intensity and high financing constraints. Overall, the findings highlight the negative consequences of IIPs, including information manipulation by managers, which exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection, thereby undermining investment efficiency.