The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study

We examine how repeated interaction can facilitate coordinated turn-taking in a two-player infinitely repeated Volunteer's Dilemma. We conjecture that repetition creates an environment for players to coordinate on the Pareto efficient, but asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria of the stage game by taking turns volunteering. We consider three cost treatments: both players have the same cost; one player has a higher cost and this cost assignment is constant; one player has a higher cost and this cost assignment is random. We find that turn-taking is the dominant play when costs are symmetric. When costs are asymmetric, the low-cost player is more likely to volunteer. However, contrary to predictions, asymmetric randomly allocated costs do not perfectly coordinate turn-taking. When costs are asymmetric and constant over time, behavior is markedly heterogeneous.

Automated summary

This study examines how repeated interaction facilitates coordinated turn-taking in a two-player Volunteer's Dilemma. The researchers find that turn-taking is dominant when costs are symmetric, but when costs are asymmetric, the low-cost player is more likely to volunteer. However, contrary to predictions, randomly allocated asymmetric costs do not perfectly coordinate turn-taking, and when costs are constant over time, player behavior becomes markedly heterogeneous.