Evolutionary game on international energy trade under the Russia-Ukraine conflict

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has triggered the global energy crisis and been one wrench in global energy markets. A surge in global energy prices is sent inflation soaring worldwide. Where are global energy markets heading? To address the wrench, we construct a tripartite energy evolutionary game including Russia, Part A countries (mainly those imposing sanctions on Russia), and Part B countries (mainly those not imposing sanctions on Russia) to depict the international energy trade under the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The results show that: (i) Part A countries' optimal economic strategy can not affect the Russian and Part B countries' strategies, and they choose to import Russian energy; (ii) All participants' strategies converge to stable states, and Russia's strategy converges faster; (iii) Russian and Part B countries' strategies are more stable than Part A countries'; (iv) Installing price caps will aggravate Part A countries' energy crises. A diplomatic effort is the best way for all participants to avert an escalation of the energy crisis.

Automated summary

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has caused a global energy crisis and disrupted global energy markets. Soaring energy prices have led to inflation worldwide. A tripartite energy evolutionary game model was constructed to analyze the international energy trade during this conflict. The results indicate that diplomatic efforts are crucial for all participants to prevent further escalation of the energy crisis.