4.8 Article

Defensive strategies against PCC attacks based on ideal (t,n)-secret sharing scheme

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ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.jksuci.2023.101784

Keywords

Tightly coupled; k-round random number selection; Randomized component; Secret sharing; Private channel cracking; Illegal participant

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This paper presents a method to increase the dependability of cloud-based applications by using a closely-coupled (t, m, n) secret sharing method to counter private channel cracking and illegal participant attacks. It also explains a common method to convert a perfect (t, n)-SS into a (t, m, n)-ITSS.
We present a method to increase the dependability of cloud-based applications. Traditional Secret Sharing Schemes (SSSs) typically fail to counter the challenges brought on by Private Channel Cracking (PCC) and Illegal Participant (IP) attacks. To prevent these attacks, we suggest a closely-coupled (t, m, n) secret sharing method that combines m(m P t) shareholders. A polynomial-based (t, m, n)-ITSS scheme is presented, which uses a k-round Random Number Selection (RNS) process to strengthen resistance to PCC assaults. A common method to convert a perfect (t, n)-SS into a (t, m, n)-ITSS is explained, which greatly enhances the defense against PCC attacks and illegal participation. The presented strategy can enhance the dependability of cloud-based applications.(c) 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

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