Nudging accurate scientific communication

The recent replicability crisis in social and biomedical sciences has highlighted the need for improvement in the honest transmission of scientific content. We present the results of two studies investigating whether nudges and soft social incentives enhance participants' readiness to transmit high-quality scientific news. In two online randomized experiments (Total N = 2425), participants had to imagine that they were science journalists who had to select scientific studies to report in their next article. They had to choose between studies reporting opposite results (for instance, confirming versus not confirming the effect of a treatment) and varying in traditional signs of research credibility (large versus small sample sizes, randomized versus non-randomized designs). In order to steer participants' choices towards or against the trustworthy transmission of science, we used several soft framing nudges and social incentives. Overall, we find that, although participants show a strong preference for studies using high-sample sizes and randomized design, they are biased towards positive results, and express a preference for results in line with previous intuitions (evincing confirmation bias). Our soft framing nudges and social incentives did not help to counteract these biases. On the contrary, the social incentives against honest transmission of scientific content mildly exacerbated the expression of these biases.

Automated summary

The recent replicability crisis in social and biomedical sciences has emphasized the importance of improving the honest transmission of scientific content. Two studies were conducted to investigate whether nudges and soft social incentives could enhance participants' readiness to transmit high-quality scientific news. The findings indicate that although participants have a preference for studies using high sample sizes and randomized designs, they are biased towards positive results and prefer results that align with their previous intuitions (confirmation bias).