4.5 Article

First Price Auction is 1-1/e2 Efficient

Related references

Note: Only part of the references are listed.
Article Computer Science, Theory & Methods

TIGHT REVENUE GAPS AMONG SIMPLE MECHANISMS

Yaonan Jin et al.

SIAM JOURNAL ON COMPUTING (2020)

Article Economics

Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing

Saeed Alaei et al.

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (2019)

Article Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence

The Price of Anarchy in Auctions

Tim Roughgarden et al.

JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH (2017)

Article Computer Science, Hardware & Architecture

Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy

Tim Roughgarden

JOURNAL OF THE ACM (2015)

Proceedings Paper Computer Science, Theory & Methods

Optimal Competitive Auctions

Ning Chen et al.

STOC'14: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 46TH ANNUAL 2014 ACM SYMPOSIUM ON THEORY OF COMPUTING (2014)

Article Economics

Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions

B Lebrun

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (2006)

Article Multidisciplinary Sciences

The nash equilibrium: A perspective

CA Holt et al.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2004)

Article Economics

Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions

E Maskin et al.

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (2003)

Article Economics

Asymmetric auctions

E Maskin et al.

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES (2000)

Article Economics

Equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions

E Maskin et al.

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES (2000)