Journal
ECONOMIC MODELLING
Volume 120, Issue -, Pages -Publisher
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2022.106187
Keywords
Auctions; Asymmetric bidders; Corruption; Multidimensional procurement
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This study examines corruption in first and second-score procurement auctions with two asymmetric bidders. It is found that the agent tends to approach the weaker bidder for a bribe as the level of bidder asymmetry increases in both auction formats. Numerical simulations suggest that the procurer prefers the first-score auction when the agent colludes with the stronger bidder, while switching to the second-score auction when the weaker bidder is favored and the corruption probability is high. Neither auction mechanism is efficient in the presence of corruption.
We examine corruption in first and second-score procurement auctions with two asymmetric bidders. We assume that an agent, who is known to be corrupt with some exogenously known probability, asks for a bribe from one of two bidders and promises to manipulate bids in return. Using a symmetric quasi-linear scoring rule, we show that the agent approaches the weaker bidder for a bribe for higher levels of bidder asymmetry in both auction formats. Our numerical simulations suggest that the procurer prefers the first-score auction when the agent colludes with the stronger bidder in the second-score auction. If the weaker bidder is favored, on the other hand, the buyer switches to the second-score auction when the probability of corruption is high. This is due to the agent's limited ability to manipulate bids in favor of the weaker bidder in the second-score auction. Finally, neither auction mechanism is efficient in the presence of corruption.
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