Impact of IFRS adoption on the disclosure of management forecasts by industry concentration

We aim to investigate the impact of the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on a firm's strategic voluntary disclosure decisions under different product market conditions. In the corporate world, firms tactically decide the level of voluntary disclosures considering their benefits, like resolving information asymmetry in the financial market, and costs, like providing proprietary information to their rivals. The adoption of IFRS has affected the demands in the financial market for complementary information, and therefore, it would affect the incentive to withhold corporate information in consideration of proprietary costs in the product market. Using a sample of Korean firms, we find that the likelihood of withholding management forecasts in concentrated industries is weaker in the post-IFRS adoption phase than in the pre-IFRS adoption phase. This is because there are greater demands for corporate disclosures for firms in concentrated industries in the post-IFRS adoption phase than earlier. Moreover, we find that the influence of IFRS on the decision of firms in concentrated industries to disclose management forecasts is significant only for firms with higher market power and higher financial leverage.

Automated summary

The study investigates the impact of IFRS adoption on firms' strategic voluntary disclosure decisions in different product market conditions. Firms strategically decide the level of voluntary disclosures based on the benefits and costs involved. The adoption of IFRS affects the demand for complementary information in the financial market, which influences firms' intention to withhold corporate information. Using Korean firms as a sample, the study finds that the likelihood of withholding management forecasts is weaker in concentrated industries after IFRS adoption. This is because there is a greater demand for corporate disclosures in concentrated industries post-IFRS adoption.