4.4 Article

Who wants (them) to work longer?

Journal

ECONOMICS LETTERS
Volume 227, Issue -, Pages -

Publisher

ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111122

Keywords

Legal retirement age; Age-specific preferences; Pension reform

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This paper examines age-specific individual preferences for the legal retirement age. Retirees and newly retired individuals tend to prefer a higher legal retirement age. A higher retirement age benefits retirees without requiring them to work longer, leading to higher pension benefits. The empirical findings support the hypothesis that newly retired individuals are most in favor of an increasing retirement age, suggesting that raising the legal retirement age is more politically feasible in aging societies.
This paper examines age-specific individual preferences for the legal retirement age. Within a theoretical model, we develop the hypothesis that retirees prefer a higher legal retirement age than workers, and that newly retired individuals prefer the highest retirement age. Retirees benefit from a positive fiscal externality. A higher legal retirement age leads to higher pension benefits, without retirees having to bear the costs in the form of a longer working life. We corroborate the hypothesis empirically with a fuzzy regression discontinuity design and show that newly retired individuals are indeed most in favor of an increasing retirement age. We conclude that in aging societies the political feasibility of raising the legal retirement age increases. (c) 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

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