Equity matters for the efficiency and effectiveness in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation-plus

By constructing a micro-actor game model that considers the distributive equity, efficiency, and effectiveness of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradationplus (REDD+), this study examines the optimal strategies of micro-actors in four equity scenarios and their impact on efficiency and effectiveness. The findings demonstrate that the equitable distribution of benefits may improve the efficiency of REDD+, which suggests that distributive equity can improve the overall welfare of society. Specifically, when landowners have equity preferences, the efficiency of REDD+ is always higher than that of the equity preference-neutral scenario. In contrast, when private investors have equity preferences, the efficiency of REDD+ is higher than that of the equity preference-neutral scenario as long as their equity preference coefficient is greater than 0.5. In addition, distributive equity does not necessarily lead to improvements in the effectiveness of REDD+, and may even damage it. Finally, a delicate tradeoff between distributive equity, efficiency, and effectiveness can achieve the sustainability of REDD+, which contributes to a solution to alleviate the tension between the three. In particular, when landowners are equity preference neutral and private investors have equity preference coefficients greater than 0.5, improvements in distributive equity can increase the efficiency of REDD+ without reducing effectiveness.

Automated summary

This study examines the optimal strategies of micro-actors in REDD+ and their impact on efficiency and effectiveness. The findings suggest that equitable distribution can improve the efficiency of REDD+ but may not necessarily lead to improvements in effectiveness.