Evolutionary game theory and simulations based on doctor and patient medical malpractice

Doctors and patients are the two critical players in medical malpractice. The evolutionary game model of doctors and patients is constructed based on information asymmetry and bounded rationality. The strategy selection problem of the two players in the medical malpractice process was studied. With change in different parameters, the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the model was demonstrated using Vensim simulation. The results show that the weight, penalty amount, benefits of standardized practices, and patient medical alarm cost of strategies of different doctors are the key factors affecting doctor-patient evolutionary game system. Medical malpractice can be reduced by adjusting the weight of different strategy choices, increasing the penalties for illegal practices, and standardizing medical malpractice costs based on doctors' standardized practice income. Measures to effectively resolve medical malpractice are proposed by introducing a third-party normative system, establishing a doctor-patient information management system, and improving doctors' reward and punishment mechanisms.

Automated summary

Doctors and patients are the critical players in medical malpractice, and their behavior is influenced by information asymmetry and bounded rationality. This study constructs an evolutionary game model for doctors and patients and examines the strategy selection problem in the medical malpractice process. Vensim simulation is used to demonstrate the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the model under different parameter settings. The results suggest that the weight, penalty amount, benefits of standardized practices, and patient medical alarm cost are key factors affecting the doctor-patient evolutionary game system. The study proposes measures to effectively address medical malpractice, including adjusting strategy weights, increasing penalties, and standardizing costs based on doctors' incomes from standardized practices.