Cross-regional collaborative governance in the process of pollution industry transfer: The case of enclave parks in China

To promote the effectiveness of cross-regional collaborative governance of pollution firm transfer, a stochastic evolutionary game model among three sectors (flying out parks, pollution firms, and flying in parks) was pro-posed. According to the three policy goals, three paths of collaborative governance were investigated using numerical simulations. Our findings focus on the following three aspects: (i) If policymakers want to urge more parks and pollution firms in the three sectors to choose a cooperation strategy, additional relocation subsidies from superior governments for pollution firms have the most remarkable effect. However, excessive subsidies will push flying out parks to inhibit the transfer of pollution firms. (ii) If policymakers intendto urge parks and pollution firms to cooperate quickly, increasing the environmental costs of firms will play key role. Notably, even if the environmental costs are low, they can still considerably and positively affect choosing a transfer strategy of for pollution firms. (iii) If policymakers expect defection parks and pollution firms to be as few as possible during the regulation process, the cost-sharing mechanism with only two sectors (flying in parks and flying out parks) is invalid. Introducing higher-level departments or other sectors for cost-sharing to escape the current dilemma is necessary.

Automated summary

In order to promote the effectiveness of cross-regional collaborative governance of pollution firm transfer, a stochastic evolutionary game model involving three sectors was proposed and three paths of collaborative governance were investigated. The findings indicate that additional relocation subsidies have the most remarkable effect in encouraging cooperation strategy, increasing environmental costs plays a key role in promoting quick cooperation, and a cost-sharing mechanism involving only two sectors is ineffective in reducing defection during the regulation process.