Heterogeneity, coordination and competition: the distribution of individual preferences in organisations

This paper experimentally investigates how inter- and intragroup heterogeneity (related to individual cooperative preferences) influences intergroup coordination. Coordination incentives are implemented through an intergroup rank-order competition. A pre-competition phase determines how individual heterogeneity is distributed across groups within an organisation. Two treatments are compared: a horizontal-heterogeneity treatment (H-Hetero, baseline), where individual differences are randomly distributed within and between groups, and a vertical-heterogeneity treatment (V-Hetero), in which groups are internally homogeneous but differ considerably from each other. In contrast to expectations, I find that vertical (intergroup) heterogeneity, when being accompanied by intragroup homogeneity, does not reduce the ability of groups to coordinate and keeps overall performance at very high levels. Indeed, subjects react more strongly to the coordination/competition incentives in vertically heterogenous organisations. Further analysis suggests that group dynamics are mainly driven by a positive orientation towards inequality (distributional preferences) of the members of the initially least cooperative groups, and their non-conditional cooperative behaviour. These results have implications for the design of group-based incentives and governance in organisations and societies.

Automated summary

This paper investigates the impact of inter- and intragroup heterogeneity on intergroup coordination. The experimental results show that vertical heterogeneity, accompanied by intragroup homogeneity, does not hinder groups' ability to coordinate and maintain high performance. The findings suggest that group dynamics are influenced by the distributional preferences and cooperative behavior of initially less cooperative groups. These findings have implications for the design of incentives and governance in organizations and societies.