Evolutionary game analysis of big data discriminatory pricing diffusion based on the supervision of relevant interest parties

The use of big data technology is significant for the market competition of two-side enterprises. However, big data technology is likely to become a tool for discriminatory pricing, causing damage to the benefit-relevant parties. This paper constructs a four party evolutionary game model between two-side enterprises, governments, suppliers, and consumers. Lotka-Volterra model is introduced to explore the evolutionary impact of the supervisory behaviors of the benefit-relevant parties on the diffusion of big data discriminatory pricing (BDDP) in two-side enterprises. Using MATLAB simulation tools, the evolution game and diffusion evolution model are mathematically deduced, and the analogue simulation is used for correlation analysis. This paper can help two-side enterprises, governments, suppliers, and consumers better understand the diffusion law of BDDP and more accurately predict the development of it. At the same time, it provides a quantitative theoretical basis for the reasonable decision-making of governments, suppliers, and consumers.

Automated summary

This study constructs a four-party evolutionary game model, using the Lotka-Volterra model to explore the impact of regulatory behavior on the diffusion of big data discriminatory pricing (BDDP) in two-sided enterprises. MATLAB simulation tools are used to mathematically deduce the evolutionary game and diffusion models, and analog simulation is used for correlation analysis. This study helps two-sided enterprises, governments, suppliers, and consumers better understand the diffusion pattern of BDDP and accurately predict its development, providing a quantitative theoretical basis for rational decision-making.