All Models Are Wrong, and Some Are Religious: Supernatural Explanations as Abstract and Useful Falsehoods about Complex Realities

Many cognitive and evolutionary theories of religion argue that supernatural expla-nations are byproducts of our cognitive adaptations. An influential argument states that our supernatural explanations result from a tendency to generate anthropomor-phic explanations, and that this tendency is a byproduct of an error management strategy because agents tend to be associated with especially high fitness costs. We propose instead that anthropomorphic and other supernatural explanations result as features of a broader toolkit of well-designed cognitive adaptations, which are designed for explaining the abstract and causal structure of complex, unobserv-able, and uncertain phenomena that have substantial impacts on fitness. Specifically, we argue that (1) mental representations about the abstract vs. the supernatural are largely overlapping, if not identical, and (2) when the data-generating processes for scarce and ambiguous observations are complex and opaque, a naive observer can improve a bias-variance trade-off by starting with a simple, underspecified explana-tion that Western observers readily interpret as supernatural. We then argue that (3) in many cases, knowledge specialists across cultures offer pragmatic services that involve apparently supernatural explanations, and their clients are frequently willing to pay them in a market for useful and effective services. We propose that at least some ethnographic descriptions of religion might actually reflect ordinary and adaptive responses to novel problems such as illnesses and natural disasters, where knowledge specialists possess and apply the best available explanations about phe-nomena that would otherwise be completely mysterious and unpredictable.

Automated summary

The supernatural explanations in religion are byproducts of our cognitive adaptations, which may result from our tendency to generate anthropomorphic explanations or a tool for explaining complex, unobservable, and uncertain phenomena. A naive observer can improve the bias-variance trade-off by starting with a simple, underspecified explanation that appears supernatural. Knowledge specialists across cultures offer pragmatic services, including supernatural explanations, and their clients are often willing to pay for these services.