The evolutionary extortion game of multiple groups in hypernetworks

As a type of zero-determinant strategies, the extortion strategy was found to be an evolutionarily stable strategy in structural groups. However, instead of complex networks structure, this paper focus on a multi-group game in hypernetworks, using the framework of a gift giving game driven by replicator-like dynamics. We find that the extortion is evolutionarily stable in the hypernetwork structure. The extortion game in hypernetworks can promote the emergence of the cooperative behavior compared to the traditional dual-strategy game and the extortion game in complex networks. The results show that the cooperation behavior attracts most of the groups for the smaller benefit value. With the increase of benefit value, cooperators turn into defectors and extortioners, but cooperation behavior still survives in hypernetworks under extreme conditions. Moreover, small-scale groups are more conducive to cooperation.

Automated summary

This study found that the extortion strategy is evolutionarily stable in hypernetworks. Compared to traditional games, the extortion game in hypernetworks promotes the emergence of cooperative behavior. Cooperators are attracted by smaller benefit values, and even under extreme conditions, cooperation behavior still survives in hypernetworks.