Private charger installation game and its incentive mechanism considering prospect theory

The construction of charging infrastructure needs to keep pace with the rapid growth of electric vehicle sales. In contrast to the increased focus and growth of public charging stations, installing private chargers remains a big challenge. We develop an evolutionary game model from the perspective of the vehicle owners and the property companies based on prospect theory to solve this dilemma. The system dynamics is innovatively utilized to investigate the mutations in evo-lution, and a specific incentive mechanism is further designed. The results show that: (1) installing private chargers is difficult due to the conflict of interest between the vehicle owners and property companies. The solution to this problem is to increase the property companies' support proportion; (2) dynamic incentives for the property companies can keep the proportion of positive strategies adopted by both parties at a high level. The earlier the intervention, the faster the stability is reached; (3) property management cost and loss of safety hazards are essential factors that must be kept within reasonable limits to prevent them from negatively impacting the incentive effect; (4) amplifying subjects' perceived value of losses and lowering their risk pref-erence can achieve a better incentive effect.

Automated summary

This study develops an incentive mechanism for solving the challenge of private charger installation based on an evolutionary game model and system dynamics. The results show that increasing property companies' support and implementing dynamic incentives can promote the installation of private chargers, while controlling management costs and safety hazards is crucial for the incentive effect.