A generalized public goods game model based on Nash bargaining

According to the actual investment and return situation, we here propose a generalized public goods game (PGG) model combining with the Nash bargaining. The effects of the segmental synergy factor and investment threshold on the evolution of individuals' be-havior are analyzed. The Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality related to the PGG are theoretically calculated firstly, and then the influences of different factors on individuals' strategy choose, the difference of individuals' strategy and individuals' gain are explored according to the numerical simulation. Results show that with the increase of investment threshold T, the difference of individuals' strategy and individuals' investment increase first and then rapidly decrease to 0. Therefore, once when the investment threshold T is larger than a certain value of Tc, all individuals will adopt the free-ride strategy. And there exists an optimal T that can maximize the average individuals' investment. With the increase of the game round, individuals' investment strategies tend to be stable, and the average investment of individuals in a heterogeneous network is greater than that in a homogeneous network. Our work tries to provide a deeper insight to network reciprocity.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Automated summary

Based on the actual investment and return situation, a generalized public goods game (PGG) model combining with Nash bargaining is proposed, and the effects of segmental synergy factor and investment threshold on individuals' behavior evolution are analyzed. The Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality related to PGG are theoretically calculated, and the influences of different factors on individuals' strategy choice, strategy difference, and gain are explored through numerical simulation. The results indicate that the increase in investment threshold T initially leads to an increase in strategy difference and investment among individuals, but then rapidly decreases to 0. Moreover, an optimal T exists that maximizes the average individuals' investment. As the game rounds increase, individuals' investment strategies tend to stabilize, and the average investment of individuals in a heterogeneous network is greater than that in a homogeneous network. This research provides a deeper insight into network reciprocity.