Games of incomplete information: A framework based on belief functions

This paper proposes a model for incomplete-information games where the knowledge of the players is represented by a Dempster-Shafer belief function. Beyond an extension of the classical definitions, it shows such a game can be transformed into an equivalent hypergraphical complete-information game (without uncertainty), thus generalizing Howson and Rosenthal's theorem to the framework of belief functions and to any number of players. The complexity of this transformation is finally studied and shown to be polynomial in the degree of k-additivity of the mass function.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Automated summary

This paper proposes a model for incomplete-information games using Dempster-Shafer belief function and proves that this type of game can be transformed into an equivalent hypergraphical complete-information game. The complexity of this transformation is shown to be polynomial in the degree of k-additivity of the mass function.