Journal
IEEE COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS
Volume 27, Issue 1, Pages 258-262Publisher
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/LCOMM.2022.3220233
Keywords
Task analysis; Contracts; Resource management; Optimization; Servers; Integrated circuits; Simulation; Edge computing; task offloading; resource sharing; computation incentive
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This study proposes a contract-based framework to address the TORSCI issue under asymmetric information. By designing a three-dimensional task-resource-reward contract, the optimal strategy for task offloading, resource sharing, and computation incentive is obtained. Simulation results demonstrate the efficiency of this contract-based incentive approach.
Edge computing is a promising technology to enable edge servers (ESs) to share computing resources for task offloading. Due to the selfish characteristic of the ESs, how to design an efficient computation incentive mechanism with the appropriate task offloading and resource allocation strategies is an essential issue. In this letter, a contract-based framework is proposed to deal with the joint task offloading, resource sharing and computation incentive (TORSCI) issue under the asymmetric information scenario. A three-dimensional task-resource-reward contract is investigated to motivate the potential ESs to participate in resource sharing. Then, based on the individual rationality and incentive compatibility conditions, the joint TORSCI optimization problem is formulated to achieve the maximum utility of the cloud server. By deriving necessary and sufficient conditions, an optimal contract is designed to obtain the joint task offloading, resource sharing and computation incentive strategy with an efficient heuristic algorithm. Simulation results demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed contract-based incentive approach.
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