Polarization in the three-state q-voter model with anticonformity and bounded confidence

Engaging with dissenting views, fostering productive disagreements or strategic anticonformity can benefit organizations as it challenges the status quo. The question arises, however, whether such strategic anticonfor-mity ultimately leads to social polarization, which is not a desirable phenomenon. We address this question within an agent-based model of discrete choices. Using the way of modeling social responses in continuous opinion models, we propose a three-state q-voter model with anticonformity and bounded confidence. We analyze the model on a complete graph using the mean-field approach and Monte Carlo simulations. We show that strong polarization appears only for a small probability of anticonformity, which means that conformity combined with homophily enhances polarization. Our findings agree with results obtained previously in the group discussion experiment and within various continuous opinion models.

Automated summary

Engaging with dissenting views and strategic anticonformity can benefit organizations, but caution is needed to prevent social polarization.