Dynamic coordinated maintenance of wind-farms with risk-averse agents under CVaR criterion

We study a coordinated maintenance problem for multi-turbine offshore wind-farms. The deterioration of the turbines follows a Poisson process and the optimal order quantity for a single wind-farm, as well as for a coalition of wind-farms, is obtained using the analogy with the risk-averse newsvendor model considering the conditional value at risk (CVaR) criterion. We apply the theory of robust dynamic coalitional games to design a stable allocation mechanism that distributes the cost of the coalition among all the participants in a fair and stable way.(c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

Automated summary

This study proposes an optimal order quantity solution for the coordinated maintenance problem of multi-turbine offshore wind-farms by modeling the turbine deterioration process and using the risk-averse newsvendor model. The theory of robust dynamic coalitional games is applied to design a fair and stable cost allocation mechanism for the coalition.