Electronic voting and strategic disclosure before shareholder meetings

Electronic voting allows shareholders to participate in shareholder meetings without being physically present. This study examines the effect of electronic voting on firms' disclosure behavior before the meetings. Empirical analyses reveal that firms that adopt electronic voting are more likely than non-adopting firms to provide good-news earnings forecasts before shareholder meetings. Firms with poorer past performance are more likely to increase disclosure. The positive returns associated with disclosure in the pre-meeting period reverse after the meeting. Overall, the results suggest that electronic voting induces strategic disclosure by managers, significantly altering the corporate information environment. (C) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Automated summary

This study examines the effect of electronic voting on firms' disclosure behavior before shareholder meetings. The results suggest that firms that adopt electronic voting are more likely to provide good-news earnings forecasts before the meetings, and firms with poorer past performance are more likely to increase disclosure.