How to motivate planners to participate in community micro-renewal: An evolutionary game analysis

In China, grassroots governments have attempted to introduce community planners into community micro-renewal, using their expertise to guide the design and implementation of community micro-renewal. However, issues remain to be studied and resolved, including how to effectively play the community planner role to coordinate multiple parties' interests. This study constructed an evolutionary game model based on the behaviors of multiple subjects with participation by community planners, to establish the payment functions on both sides of the game under different choice strategies; explore evolutionary stabilization strategies by replication dynamic equations; and to analyze the conditions for the multi-party evolutionary game to reach the ideal stable state. The findings: (1) Show that financial subsidies provided by the grassroots government to community planners have a positive effect on the latter's behavioral choices; (2) Illustrate the path of the tripartite evolutionary game among the grassroots government, residents, and community planners to reach ideal stability (incentive, active participation, and positive promotion); and (3) Describe how the project benefits from community planners promoting community micro-renewal can effectively promote their positive behavioral choices.

Automated summary

This study constructed an evolutionary game model based on the behaviors of multiple subjects with participation by community planners in community micro-renewal. The findings show that financial subsidies provided by the grassroots government to community planners have a positive effect on their behavioral choices. The study also illustrates the path of the tripartite evolutionary game among the grassroots government, residents, and community planners to reach ideal stability.