Journal
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Volume 119, Issue 44, Pages -Publisher
NATL ACAD SCIENCES
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2214072119
Keywords
fMRI; construal level theory; imagination; prospection; delay discounting
Categories
Funding
- National Cancer Institute [R01-CA-170297, R35-CA-197461]
- National Institute on Drug Abuse [R01-DA-029149]
- National Institute on Aging [P30 AG-012836-18]
- Boettner Center for Pensions and Retirement Security
- NIH National Institute of Child Health and Development Population Research Infrastructure Program [R24 HD-044964-9]
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Multiple theories in psychology suggest that people discount future rewards because they imagine them less vividly than immediate events, thereby reducing their perceived value. This study provides neuroscientific evidence for this proposal, showing that neural measures of vividness decline as rewards are delayed farther into the future.
Why do people discount future rewards? Multiple theories in psychology argue that one reason is that future events are imagined less vividly than immediate events, thereby diminishing their perceived value. Here we provide neuroscientific evidence for this proposal. First, we construct a neural signature of the vividness of prospective thought, using an fMRI dataset where the vividness of imagined future events is orthogonal to their valence by design. Then, we apply this neural signature in two additional fMRI datasets, each using a different delay-discounting task, to show that neural measures of vividness decline as rewards are delayed farther into the future.
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