Dynamic pricing for the successive-generation products in the presence of strategic customers and limited trade-in duration

Purpose This paper investigates the dynamic pricing strategy of a firm for the successive-generation products under the conditions of the limited trade-in duration and strategic customers. Further, it explores the effect of a limited trade-in duration on the choice of the myopic and strategic customers, besides the optimal dynamic pricing and trade-in strategy of the firm. Design/methodology/approach Based on the choice behavior of the myopic and strategic customers, the authors have developed a two-period game-theoretic analytical model to decide the optimal retail prices of the successive-generation products and the optimal trade-in rebate when the firm adopts a dynamic pricing strategy and then investigate three extensions of the basic model to discuss the change in the results owing to the relaxation of certain conditions. Findings The authors find from the results that, in terms of profit maximization, it is better to extend the limited trade-in duration, and hence, the firm should implement a dynamic pricing strategy. However, in the situation of using a static pricing strategy, the firm should extend the limited trade-in duration only if the incremental value of the new generation products is below a certain threshold. Moreover, the firm should use a dual rollover strategy instead of a single rollover one. If all customers in the market are myopic, then the firm should also extend the limited trade-in duration. Research limitations/implications This study mainly discusses the impact of limited trade-in duration on the firm's dynamic pricing strategy when facing strategic customers, which provides several directions for future research. First, if the government offers subsidies to consumers, how will strategic consumers make purchase decisions? How would the enterprise make its pricing decision? Second, when asymmetric information exists between consumers and firms, how will it affect consumers' choice behavior and firms' pricing decisions? All these issues are worth exploring in the future. Practical implications These results offer certain managerial insights for the firm in the decision making on pricing within the trade-in program. Originality/value This is the first work to study the dynamic pricing strategy of the firm for the successive-generation products under the conditions of the limited trade-in duration and strategic customers. Further, this work discusses the changes in results owing to the relaxation of certain conditions.

Automated summary

This paper investigates the dynamic pricing strategy of a firm for successive-generation products under the conditions of limited trade-in duration and strategic customers. It explores the effect of limited trade-in duration on the choice behavior of myopic and strategic customers, as well as the optimal dynamic pricing and trade-in strategy of the firm. The authors develop a two-period game-theoretic analytical model and find that extending the limited trade-in duration and implementing a dynamic pricing strategy is better for profit maximization. The results also suggest using a dual rollover strategy instead of a single rollover one.