The effect of government policies and consumer green preferences on the R&D diffusion of new energy vehicles: A perspective of complex network games

Consumer preferences and government policies are important factors that affect the diffusion of new energy vehicles (NEVs). Based on the complex network evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a R&D diffusion model of NEVs considering the emission trading scheme (ETS), and studies the effect of consumer green preferences and related government policies on the R&D diffusion of NEVs. The simulation analysis shows that: (1) consumer green preferences and the quota system have duality to the R&D diffusion of NEVs, which means that while increasing the proportion of NEV enterprises, they inhibit the R&D diffusion among NEV enterprises. (2) NEV enterprises are more inclined to invest in R&D projects with a low success probability, rather than those with a high success probability. (3) When the carbon price reaches a certain threshold, the ETS will facilitate the R&D diffusion of NEVs. However, with the further increase of the carbon price, the promotional effect will weaken. (4) When the R&D tax incentives reach a certain threshold, the increase in R&D tax incentives will greatly promote the R&D diffusion of NEVs. However, the promotional effect has an upper limit.(c) 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Automated summary

This study investigates the impact of consumer preferences and government policies on the R&D diffusion of new energy vehicles (NEVs) using complex network evolutionary game theory. Simulation analysis shows that consumer green preferences and the quota system have a dual effect on R&D diffusion, while carbon price and R&D tax incentives can promote R&D diffusion with certain thresholds and limits.