Comparative analysis of risk-aversion and strategic investment behavior in generation expansion

Both risk-averse behavior and strategic bidding may distort the outcome of energy and capacity markets. Although these two behavioral aspects may trigger similar bidding behavior and investments into generation capacity, they are fundamentally different.While in the literature risk-aversion and strategic behavior have been investigated separately, the presented research offers a comparative analysis to identify situations in which both types of behavior result in the same outcome. First, a framework is introduced in which both strategic and risk-averse behavior can be investigated for a generation expansion planning problem. The problem including the risk-averse investor is modeled as a Nash-equilibrium problem and solved via Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers, whereas the Stackelberg game between the strategic agent and the markets is formulated as a bi-level optimization problem and solved using disjunctive constraints.Using a set of 1920 problem instances we reveal that the distinguishability of the two types of behavior is highly technology-dependent and influenced by the way the capacity target is set. Implications of this work may support regulators in disentangling risk-aversion and strategic behavior based on observed market outcomes.

Automated summary

This research examines the impact of risk-averse behavior and strategic bidding on energy and capacity market outcomes. By introducing a comparative analysis framework, the study identifies situations where these two behaviors lead to the same outcomes. The implications of this work for regulators lie in their ability to differentiate risk-aversion from strategic behavior based on observed market outcomes.