Journal
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS
Volume 44, Issue 1, Pages 399-415Publisher
JOHN WILEY & SONS LTD
DOI: 10.1002/mde.3689
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This study investigates the joint trade-in rebate strategies in a supply chain with independent manufacturers and a dominant retailer. It finds that a differentiated rebate scheme benefits the retailer, while cooperation among manufacturers leads to win-win outcomes. However, replacement consumers may benefit from a uniform rebate scheme and non-cooperation among manufacturers, which is more environmentally friendly.
This study investigates the joint trade-in rebate strategies in a supply chain with independent manufacturers selling substitutable products via a dominant retailer. We model their interplay as a Stackelberg game and analyze their joint trade-in rebate decisions. We find that the differentiated trade-in rebate scheme is better for the retailer, and the manufacturers cooperating in making their trade-in rebate decisions can achieve win-win results in most cases. However, replacement consumers could benefit from the retailer's uniform trade-in rebate scheme and the manufacturers not cooperating in their trade-in decisions. The latter is always more beneficial to the environment.
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