Informative advertising in monopolistically competitive markets

Firms spend a half-trillion dollars advertising each year. To model and examine the wel-fare effects of advertising with heterogeneous goods Grossman and Shapiro (1984) model informative advertising in monopolistic competition find that informative advertising is socially excessive for large numbers of sellers. However, it has been noted that their equi-librium may not exist. We present a tractable model of informative advertising in monop-olistic competition replacing the standard assumption of a finite number of firms with a continuum of firms. We derive conditions for equilibrium existence and find that in the monopolistically-competitive model, informative advertising is socially insufficient. We also find that with free entry, the measure of the set of active firms is lower than the socially optimal one. The comparison of our results with the results of Grossman and Shapiro (1984) also shows that a pure-strategy, symmetric equilibrium typically does not exist in the latter model if the number of sellers is large, a fact which accounts for the different conclusions drawn in the two papers.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Automated summary

This study examines the welfare effects of informative advertising in a monopolistic competition context. By introducing a continuum of firms, we find that informative advertising is socially insufficient and free entry results in a lower number of active firms compared to the socially optimal solution. Our results also highlight the impact of the number of sellers on equilibrium existence and conclusions, which differs from previous studies.