Demand information sharing of fresh produce supply chain considering competing suppliers' freshness-keeping effort

This paper considers a fresh produce supply chain in which a retailer sources alternative produce from two competing suppliers. The suppliers make efforts to preserve product freshness, while the retailer, with demand forecast information, can share it with none, one or both of the suppliers strategically. By constructing a multistage game model, the optimal demand information sharing strategy in the supply chain is explored. The results show that the retailer has the willingness to disclose demand information only when the freshness elasticity is high. Significantly, with the improvement of the freshness elasticity, the retailer will transform from sharing information with both suppliers to one supplier. The suppliers are always willing to accept the information disclosed by the retailer. However, complete transparency of demand information may hurt the supply chain under certain conditions. To improve the supply chain performance, the retailer can charge both suppliers for information fees and adjust from sharing information with no suppliers to both suppliers with a relatively low freshness elasticity. Conversely, the retailer can change from sharing information with both suppliers to sharing information with one supplier through a charging contract with a relatively high freshness elasticity.

Automated summary

This paper examines the demand information sharing strategy in a fresh produce supply chain. The results show that the suppliers are always willing to accept the information disclosed by the retailer, but complete transparency of demand information may hurt the supply chain. To improve the supply chain performance, the retailer needs to choose the appropriate information sharing strategy based on the freshness elasticity.